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Digital fingerprinting of multimedia contents involves the generation of a fingerprint, the embedding operation, and the realization
of traceability from redistributed contents. Considering a buyer’s right, the asymmetric property in the transaction between a buyer
and a seller must be achieved using a cryptographic protocol. In the conventional schemes, the implementation of a watermarking
algorithm into the cryptographic protocol is not deeply discussed. In this paper, we propose the method for implementing the
spread spectrum watermarking technique in the fingerprinting protocol based on the homomorphic encryption scheme. We first
develop a rounding operation which converts real values into integer and its compensation, and then explore the tradeoff between
the robustness and communication overhead. Experimental results show that our system can simulate Cox’s spread spectrum
watermarking method into asymmetric fingerprinting protocol.
1. Introduction
Due to the recent advances in broad-band network and
multimedia technologies, the distribution and sharing of
digital multimedia contents are increasing. It also helps a
malicious party to duplicate and redistribute the contents,
hence the protection of the ownership is strongly required.
Encryption of the content cannot solve the problem because
it must be ultimately decrypted at legitimate users who are
the potential traitors in the future. Therefore, additional pro-
tection mechanisms are needed to discourage unauthorized
redistribution. One of the mechanisms is the fingerprinting
of multimedia which enables a seller to trace illegal users by
embedding identification information into the content prior
to distribution [1].
The research on fingerprinting techniques is classified
into two studies: collusion resistant fingerprinting systems
and cryptographic protocol. Since each user purchases a
content containing his own fingerprint, each content is
slightly different. If users collect some of them, they try
to find the difference and delete/change the embedded
information. In order to tolerate such an attack, designing
collusion resistant fingerprint codes [2, 3] and orthogonal
fingerprinting schemes like the spread spectrum watermark-
ing technique [4] had been proposed. In a cryptographic
protocol, the goal is to achieve the asymmetric property
between a buyer and a seller such that only the buyer can
obtain a uniquely watermarked content because of the threat
of dispute. If both of the parties know the content, the buyer
may redistribute a pirated copy but later repudiate it by
insisting that the copy come from the seller.
In [5–9], the asymmetric protocol is performed by
exploiting the homomorphic property of the public-key
cryptosystem that enables a seller to obtain the ciphertext of
watermarked content by operating an encrypted fingerprint
with an encrypted content. Since the ciphertext is computed
using a buyer’s encryption key, only the buyer can decrypt
it; hence, only he can obtain the watermarked content.
It is also desirable for the fingerprinting protocol to
solve the unbinding problem such that the relation between
fingerprint information and a specific transaction performed
by a buyer and a seller [10]. On the other hand, Pfitzmann
and Sadeghi [5, 6] introduced the digital cash scheme
to a fingerprinting protocol, and Camenisch [7] used
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group signature schemes for the solution of the unbinding
problem. In both schemes, bit commitment schemes are
exploited at the embedding protocol using zero-knowledge
proof because the protocol is performed only by a buyer and
seller. For the realization of two-party protocol, their scheme
sacrifices the selection of embedding information, namely
a fingerprint. In their protocol, a fingerprint is a randomly
selected integer by a buyer, and each bit of the fingerprint is
committed to a seller for the security reason. In such a case,
the encoding of the fingerprint by a collusion secure code
[2, 3, 11] is difficult because the seller cannot check that
the committed data is the codeword, and the exploitation
of the spread spectrum watermarking technique is also
difficult. In addition, the protocol of the zero-knowledge
proof consumes much communicational resources for
the transaction. These characteristics greatly degrade the
practicality of the fingerprinting protocol.
The fingerprinting protocol in [10] introduced a trusted
authority who generates a robust fingerprint when valid
items of a certain transaction between a buyer and a seller
are transmitted from the seller. Furthermore, the enciphering
rate of the two-party protocol applied in the conventional
schemes [6, 7] must be less than 1/103 for the security of
commitment schemes. If the data size of a content is 1 MB,
the amount of communication data is more than 1 GB,
which is extremely inefficient. In [9], the enciphering rate is
drastically improved using a public-key cryptosystem with an
additive homomorphism. Although the homomorphic prop-
erty is effective for constructing asymmetric fingerprinting,
there are still problems in its implementation.
In this paper, we propose the method for implementing
the spread spectrum watermarking technique by carefully
designing parameters for rounding operation. The prelimi-
nary version of this paper was presented in EUSIPCO2008
[12]. If frequency components of digital contents are used
for the embedding of fingerprint information, they must be
quantized in order to truncate real value to integer. Then, the
precision of the frequency components should be considered
in order not to degrade a watermarked image. When the
spread spectrum watermarking technique in [4] is applied,
the precision of the representing watermark signal is sensitive
for the implementation. By scaling up the parameters by
multiplying a constant factor, the precision is increased in
our scheme. Then, the tradeoff between the scaling factor and
the amount of data to be transmitted must be considered. In
addition, for the characteristic of the fingerprinting protocol,
frequency components and the watermark signal must be
separately encrypted after quantization. In such a case, the
consistency of the precision is a sensitive issue. Since an
embedding operation is performed by addition of frequency
components and a spread spectrum sequence, the additive
homomorphic property of public-key cryptosystems [13, 14]
can be directly exploited for the embedding. Then, the sepa-
rate rounding operation causes interference terms in a deci-
phered data at a buyer side. Without loss of secrecy of an orig-
inal content, the interference term is removed after decryp-
tion. The performance of our proposed method is evaluated
by comparing it with the conventional scheme [4], which
confirms the similar identification capability of illegal buyers.
2. Related Works
2.1. Asymmetric Property. If both a buyer and a seller obtain
a watermarked content in a fingerprinting protocol, the seller
cannot prove the illegal distribution by the buyer to a third
party, even if the buyer’s fingerprint is extracted. This is
because the seller may distribute it himself in order to frame
an innocent buyer. Hence, it is desirable that only a buyer is
able to obtain his own fingerprinted content in the protocol.
Such a protocol is called asymmetric fingerprinting protocol
which concept was presented by Pfitzmann and Schunter
[15]. In order to achieve such an asymmetric property,
the homomorphic property of public-key cryptosystems is
introduced in the fingerprinting protocols [8, 9, 16].
Let E(M) be a ciphertext of a message M. The homomor-
phic property satisfies the following equation:
g(E(M1),E(M2)) = E
(
f (M1,M2)
)
, (1)
where g(·) and f (·) is one of the operations, addition,
multiplication, XOR, and so forth, which is related to
the applied cryptosystem and the embedding algorithm
(Most public-key cryptosystems select multiplication for
g(·)). If M1 is regarded as a digital content and M2 as
a fingerprint, the fingerprint can be embedded in the
content without decryption by multiplying those ciphertexts.
Since they are calculated using a buyer’s public encryption-
key, the watermarked content is decrypted only by the
buyer, hence the asymmetric property is satisfied. The
embedding operation based on the homomorphic property
is basically performed for each element of fingerprint
information which will be composed of bit-sequence or
spread spectrum sequence, hence each element is separately
embedded in its corresponding position. Thus, M1 is not
the entire content, but one of the components like the
frequency elements to be fingerprinted by a watermarking
technique. When the vector representation of M1 is given
by {m1,1,m1,2,m1,3, . . .}, the ciphertext is also represented as
E(M1) = {E(m1,1),E(m1,2),E(m1,3), . . .}. As a consequence,
the detail of (1) is given by
g
(
E
(
m1,i
)
,E
(
m2,i
)) = E( f (m1,i,m2,i
))
, (i = 1, 2, 3, . . .).
(2)
Memon and Wong [8] apply multiplicative property of
RSA scheme [17] to embed the fingerprint, and Pfitzmann
and Sadeghi [5, 6] exploit bit commitment schemes based
on the quadratic residues [18]. Kuribayashi and Tanaka
[9] apply the additive homomorphic property of public-
key cryptosystem such as Okamoto Uchiyama encryption
scheme [13] and Paillier cryptosystem [14].
In watermarking techniques [1] for digital images, it
is advisable to embed information in the frequency com-
ponents for both the robustness and perceptual quality.
However, as the frequency components are generally repre-
sented by real value, there is a difficult problem to apply
cryptographic techniques directly because they are based
on the algebraic property of integers. Many schemes [8,
10] ignored the implementation of watermarking algorithm
into the asymmetric fingerprinting protocols, instead they
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merely showed the validity of the cryptographic protocols
which ensure the asymmetric property and the anonymity
of buyers.
Considering the adaption of watermarking techniques
for cryptographic fingerprinting protocol, a quantization
method is useful as a fingerprint that can be embedded when
the coefficients are quantized. In [9], the quantization index
modulation based watermarking technique (QIM) [19] is
applied for the embedding procedure because it rounds the
values of frequency components in integers. Prins et al.
[20] adapted three kinds of dithering modulations, which
can improve the robustness of the QIM method, to the
fingerprinting scheme, and implemented the method using a
sufficiently large scaling factor. However, the enciphering rate
is neglected. We assume that the bit-length of the message
space is M and that of each watermarked frequency compo-
nents is m. Generally, M is much larger than m. In order to
exploit the message space effectively, dozens of watermarked
frequency components are packed in one message in [9],
hence, the enciphering rate is almost equivalent to that of
an applied cryptosystem by suitably designing the message
space of a ciphertext. It is remarkable that a negative number
must be avoided because it is represented by much longer
bit-sequence under the finite field of applied cryptosystem,
which affects the other packed ones.
Although the capacity of embeddable information is
large, considering the robustness against collusion attacks
the spread spectrum watermarking technique is superior
to QIM and its variants. In [8], the adaption of Cox’s
spread spectrum watermarking scheme [4] is discussed.
Regretfully, there is a problem in the implementation because
the rounding-off operation is not deeply considered for the
spread spectrum watermarking algorithm.
2.2. Collusion Resilience. It is important to generate finger-
prints that can identify colluders. In a fingerprinting scheme,
each fingerprinted copy is slightly different, hence, malicious
users will collect some copies with respective watermark in
order to remove/alter the watermark. A number of works on
designing fingerprints that are resistant against the collusion
attack have been proposed. Many of them can be categorized
into two approaches. One is to exploit the Spread Spectrum
(SS) technique [4, 21, 22], and the other approach is to devise
an exclusive code, known as collusion-secure code [2, 3, 11],
which has traceability of colluders.
In the former approach, spread spectrum sequences
which follow a normal distribution are assigned to users
as fingerprints. The origin of the spread spectrum water-
marking scheme is Cox’s method [4] that embeds the
sequence into frequency components of digital image and
detects it using a correlator. Since normally distributed values
allow the theoretical and statistical analysis of the method,
modeling of a variety of attacks have been studied. Studies in
[21] have shown that a number of nonlinear collusions such
as interleaving attack can be well approximated by averaging
collusion plus additive noise. So far, many variants of the
spread spectrum watermarking scheme are based on the
Cox’s method.
Since the QIM watermarking technique [9] and its
variants [20] are aiming at the extraction of a watermark
bit-sequence, the latter approach is suitable to implement.
The practicality of the latter approach is, however, restricted
because of the long code length. In [23], the capability of
QIM for the latter approach has been explored. The results
show that one variant, which is called the spread transform
dither modulation (STDM), retains an advantage under the
blind detection. Under the non-blind detection, which is a
reasonable assumption in a fingerprinting system, there is
still a performance gap with the spread spectrum method.
Moreover, in [24], the traceability is further improved by
combining a spread spectrum embedding like Cox’s method.
Hereafter, we focus on the implementation of Cox’s method
in a fingerprinting protocol.
Let W be a watermark signal composed of L elements
wi ∈ N(0, 1), (1 ≤ i ≤ L) and each of them is embedded
into selected DCT coefficient xi, (1 ≤ i ≤ L) based on the
following equation:
x′i = xi(1 + αwi), (3)
where N(0, 1) is a normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1, and α is an embedding strength. At the detector
side, we determine which SS sequence is present in a test
image by evaluating the similarity of sequences. From the
suspicious copy, a sequence W˜ is detected by calculating the
difference from the original image, and its similarity with W
is obtained as follows:
sim
(
W , W˜
)
= W · W˜√
W˜ · W˜
. (4)
If the value exceeds a threshold, the embedded sequence is
regarded as W . When an original image is available, the
above similarity measurement is valid because the main
interference term, which is the frequency components of
the original image, can be completely removed at the
detection. However, under the blind detection, the removal
of the interference term becomes a serious problem for an
optimum detection. There are some related works [25, 26]
concerning to the problem. Since our scope is to implement
the spread spectrum method on the encrypted domain in
the asymmetric protocol, the detail of the related works
is omitted in this paper. Furthermore, in a fingerprinting,
it is assumed that an original image is available at the
detection because the operation is performed by the author
or his agent. Hence, at the detection, DCT coefficients
of a test image are subtracted from those of the original
image, and then the correlations with every candidates
of watermark signal are computed. Thus, non-blind and
informed watermarking scheme can be applied.
A simple, yet effective collusion attack is to average
some variants of copy because when c copies are averaged,
the similarity value calculated by (4) results in shrinking
by a factor of c, which will be roughly
√
L/c [4]. Even
in this case, we can detect the embedded watermark and
identify colluders by using an appropriately designed thresh-
old.
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2.3. Unbinding Problem. In the elementary fingerprinting
protocol [8] involving a trusted authority, fingerprint infor-
mation to be embedded is not well considered, which is
merely related to user’s information such as name, address,
phone number, e-mail address, and so forth. When a seller
finds an illegal copy and detects the corresponding buyer
by extracting the fingerprint, he will go to court with the
collected proofs. A malicious seller, however, frames the
detected buyer by embedding the obtained fingerprint into
other contents which are more expensive than the detected
one that he really sold to the buyer. Therefore, once a seller
obtains a fingerprint, it is possible for him to transplant it
into another more expensive contents so that he can get
compensated more.
In [10], a fingerprint is binded with a common agree-
ment (ARG) by producing the signature of a trusted
watermark certification authority (WCA), and the transaction
of digital contents is uniquely associated with a log file. For
anonymity of buyers, a digital certification authority (CA)
is introduced in the fingerprinting protocol. A buyer B first
randomly selects a key pair (pkB, skB), where pkB and skB
are the public and secret keys of public-key cryptosystem,
respectively. He sends pkB, which is a pseudonym associated
with B, to CA in order to get an anonymous certificate
CertCA(pkB). When B makes an order to a seller S, he checks
the validity of CertCA(pkB). Then S asks WCA to generate
a unique watermark W for the current transaction between
B and S. The protocol between the buyer B and seller S is
summarized below (the detail is referred to [10]).
(1) B selects one-time key pair (pk, sk) and generates
its certificate CertpkB (pk) using the public key pkB.
After making a common agreement ARG, B calcu-
lates a digital signature Signpk(ARG) using the one-
time public key pk. B sends pkB, pk, CertCA(pkB),
CertpkB (pk), ARG, and Signpk(ARG) to S.
(2) If the validity of the received items is verified, S
generates a watermark V and embeds it into contents
X . The watermarked one is denoted by X (V). The
watermark is reference information to retrieve this
sale record from illegally distributed copy; hence it
could be omitted if the seller wants to avoid the
degradation of quality. Then, S send CertpkB (pk),
ARG, Signpk(ARG), and X (V) to WCA.
(3) Upon receiving the items, WCA verifies the validity
of the certificate and signature, and reject the trans-
action if any of them is invalid. Otherwise, using
X (V) it generates an unique and robust watermark
W as fingerprint information which is specific to this
transaction. Then, it computes Epk(W), EpkWCA (W),
and SignWCA(Epk(W), pk, Signpk(ARG)), and sends
them back to S.
(4) When S receives the response, the embedding opera-
tion in encrypted domain is performed by computing
Epk
(
X (W ,V)
)
= Epk
(
X (V)
)
⊕ Epk(W), (5)
CertCA(pkB), CertpkB (pk),
ARG, Signpk(ARG)
Epk(X(W ,V))
CertpkB (pk), ARG
Signpk(ARG),X(V)
Epk(W),EpkWCA (W),
SignWCA(Epk(W), pk, Signpk(ARG))
B S WCA
Figure 1: The transaction of the fingerprinting protocol.
where ⊕ implies the embedding operation based
on the homomorphic property. Then, S delivers
Epk(X (W ,V)) to B.
(5) After decrypting the received Epk(X (W ,V)), B obtains
the watermarked content X (W ,V),
where Epk(·) is an enciphering function using a public key
pk. The flow of the transaction is summarized in Figure 1.
3. Implementation for
Watermarking Algorithm
In this section, we show how to implement the spread
spectrum watermarking technique [4] in the fingerprinting
protocol based on the homomorphic property of public-
key cryptosystem. Hereafter, for simplicity, the embedding
of the reference information V is omitted in the protocol,
and we assume that an original image is composed of M×N
pixels and is represented by the DCT selected coefficients
xi, (1 ≤ i ≤ L) and the remaining ones xi, (L+1 ≤ i ≤MN).
3.1. Embedding. The embedding operation in (3) can be
easily performed using the additive homomorphic property
of public-key cryptosystems such as the Okamoto-Uchiyama
encryption scheme [13] and the Paillier cryptosystem [14].
Remember that (3) is composed of two operations; multi-
plication and addition for g(·) and f (·), respectively. Since
the multiplication is realized by the iteration of addition, the
embedding operation is represented by the multiplication
and exponentiation as follows:
Epk(xi(1 + αwi)) = Epk(xi) · Epk(wi)αxi . (6)
The above operation can be directly applied for the operation
⊕ in (5). Here, it is noticed that a watermark signal and
DCT coefficients are generally represented by real values and
they must be rounded to integers before the encryption.
If such parameters are directly rounded to the nearest
integers, it may result in the loss of information. Hence, they
should be scaled before rounding-off. In addition, negative
numbers should be avoided considering the property of a
cryptosystem as mentioned in Section 2.1 Hence, a rounding
operation that maps real value into positive integer is
required.
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At first, we show the operation concerning to a water-
mark signalW = {w1,w2,w3, . . . ,wL}. Since the ciphertext of
W is computed by a watermark certification authority WCA,
the enciphering operation is performed previously sent to a
seller S. A constant positive integer value pw is added to each
element of watermark signal wi, (1 ≤ i ≤ L) to make the
value positive. Then, it is scaled by a factor of sw in order to
keep the degree of precision, and it is quantized to wi. Such
operations are formalized by the following one equation:
wi = int
(
sw
(
wi + pw
))
= sw
(
wi + pw
)
+ wi , 1 ≤ i ≤ L,
(7)
where int(a) outputs the nearest integer from a real
value a, and wi is the quantization error of wi. After
the operation, WCA encrypts W = {w1,w2,w3, . . . ,wL}
using a public key pk, and the ciphertexts Epk(W) =
{Epk(w1),Epk(w2),Epk(w3), . . . ,Epk(wL)}, pw and sw are sent
to S. It is noted that Epk(W) corresponds to Epk(W) in
Figure 1, and the corresponding ciphertext of EpkWCA (W) is
also sent to S.
Next, S performs the rounding operation to DCT
coefficients xi, (1 ≤ i ≤ L) as follows. A positive integer value
px is added to each DCT coefficient, and then scaled by swsx.
By quantizing it, the rounded DCT coefficient xi is obtained:
xi = int
(
swsx
(
xi + px
))
= swsx
(
xi + px
)
+ xi , 1 ≤ i ≤ L,
(8)
where xi is the quantization error of xi. For the control of
rounding operation of each DCT coefficient, the watermark
strength α is modified to αi;
αi = int(sxα|xi|)
= sxα|xi| + αi , 1 ≤ i ≤ L,
(9)
where αi is the quantization error of αi. Using the above
items, S embeds wi into xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ L based on the additive
homomorphic property of public cryptosystem as follows:
Epk(xi) · Epk(wi)αi = Epk(xi + αiwi). (10)
Since the plain value of the ciphertext Epk(xi + αiwi) is
xi + αiwi = int
(
swsx
(
xi + px
))
+ int
(
sxα|xi|sw
(
wi + pw
))
= swsx
(
xi + αwi|xi| +
(
px + α|xi|pw
))
+ sxα|xi|wi + sw
(
wi + pw
)
αi + xi + αiwi .
(11)
The scaling factor s = swsx and the adjustment factor
p = int(px + α|xi|pw) are necessary to calculate the actual
watermarked DCT coefficients xi+αwi|xi|. The reason why p
is rounded to an integer is explained in Section 3.4 Therefore,
these two parameters s and p are sent to B as well as Epk(xi +
αiwi). It is noticed that the remaining DCT coefficients
xi, (L + 1 ≤ i ≤ MN) should be sent to B. In order to
keep the secrecy of the embedding position, they must be
encrypted before delivery. Without loss of generality, the
rounding operation for those coefficients are given by
xi = int
(
sxsw
(
xi + p
))
= sxsw
(
xi + p
)
+ xi , L + 1 ≤ i ≤MN ,
(12)
and the ciphertexts Epk(xi) are sent with Epk(xi + αiwi)
to B. Namely, the ciphertexts of a watermarked image
Epk(XW ), which is corresponding to Epk(X (W ,V)) in Figure 1,
is composed of those ones.
3.2. Decryption and Post-Processing. After the decryption of
the received ciphertexts Epk(XW ), B divides the results by
a factor of s, and then subtracts p as the post-processing
operation. It is noticed that the adjustment factor p contains
a rounding error pi , so it is rewritten by
p = px + α|xi|pw + pi . (13)
At the embedding position, the ciphertexts are Epk(xi +αiwi)
and the post-processing operation outputs the watermarked
coefficients xi + αwi|xi| as follows:
Dsk
(
Epk(xi + αiwi)
)
s
− p = xi + αwi|xi| + i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L,
(14)
where Dsk(·) is a deciphering function using a secret key sk
and i is the total rounding error represented by
i = α|xi|wi
sw
+
(
wi + pw
)
αi
sx
+
xi + αiwi
sxsw
− pi . (15)
At the other position, the ciphertexts are Epk(xi) and B
obtains xi after the postprocessing operation:
Dsk
(
Epk(xi)
)
s
− p = xi + xi
sxsw
, L + 1 ≤ i ≤MN. (16)
It is remarkable that the embedding position is kept secret
from B, the classification of the above operations is difficult.
3.3. Amount of Quantization Error. If an original image is
available at the detection, the embedded watermark signal is
extracted by calculating the differences of pirated copy’s DCT
coefficients from the original ones. The extracted signal w˜i
must contain the quantization error caused by the rounding
operation at embedding, and it is represented by
w˜i = (xi + αwi|xi| + i)− xi
α|xi|
= wi + i
α|xi| , 1 ≤ i ≤ L.
(17)
The amount of quantization error i/α|xi| depends on the
parameters sw, sx, pw, and px:
i
α|xi| =
wi
sw
+
(
wi + pw
)
αi
α|xi|sx +
xi + αiwi
α|xi|sxsw −
pi
α|xi| . (18)
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It is noted that the values of the quantization errors wi ,
xi , αi and pi is uniformly distributed within the range
[−0.5, 0.5). So, if the scaling parameter sw is small, the
term wi /sw remains as a dominant factor in i/α|xi|, and
the quantization error is almost uniformly distributed in the
range.
The energy of the quantization error in a watermarked
copy is
η =
L∑
i=1
(
i
α|xi|
)2
. (19)
Suppose that each watermarked copy contains a quantization
error with energy η and c colluders average their copies. As
the value of each copy’s i/α|xi| becomes 1/c, the energy
becomes η/c2. The averaged copy contains the sum of such
attenuated quantization error, hence the total energy of the
quantization error in the averaged copy is estimated to be
η/c. With the increase of c, the energy of the quantization
error is to be dropped to 1/c of its original value.
3.4. Consideration. In Cox’s method, a watermark W is
selected from Gaussian distribution N(0, 1). From the sta-
tistical property, when a parameter pw is given, the error
probability that wi + pw is less than 0 is obtained as follows:
Pr
(
wi + pw < 0
) = 1
2
erfc
(
pw√
2
)
, (20)
where erfc() stands for the complementary error function. In
other words, if the error probability is fixed, we can calculate
the smallest integer pw. For example, when pw = 5, the
error probability is Pr(wi + pw < 0) = 2.87 × 10−7. Under
a certain probability, when wi + pw is less than 0, such a value
is rounded to 0 in order to avoid the underflow. Considering
the amount of the quantization error in (18), it is desirable
to select pw as small as possible.
In (3), the watermarked coefficient x′i is composed of
two terms; xi and αwixi. Since wi is encrypted at the center
WCA prior to the embedding operation at S, xi and wi are
rounded separately. Considering the post-processing at B,
the scaling factors sw, sx, and the compensation factor p
should be constant. Here, we assume that a constant value is
uniformly added to real values which are wi and xi to make it
positive. Then, B must subtract the interference term related
to both xi and wi, which requires additional communication
costs. If the adjustment factor p is varied with respect to xi,
the amount of information to be sent to B from S becomes
very large. In order to avoid it, we set p a constant value by
controlling the value px. Even if p and α is known and pw is
fixed, to obtain xi is still informationally difficult because of
two unknown parameters px and xi for a given one equation
p = int(px + α|xi|pw). As a consequence, the secrecy of
the original DCT coefficients is assured. If the value of p is
sufficiently large, that of the parameter px is also large and
hence the value of xi + px is positive.
3.5. Concatenation. Notice that if the values of scaling factors
sw are sx are increased, the proposed scheme can simulate
the original Cox method more precisely. From the viewpoint
of enciphering rate, however, these factors should be small.
Referring to [9], the bit-length of a watermarked coefficient
x′i = xi + αiwi, which is represented by a constant bit-
length x, is much smaller than that of message space in
cryptosystems such as the Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption
scheme [13] and the Paillier cryptosystem [14], and some of
x′i are packed in one message M:
M = x′i
∥
∥x′i+1
∥
∥ · · · || x′i+δ−1, (21)
where ‖ denotes a concatenation and δ is the number of
packed coefficients which is dependent on sw and sx. Such a
packing operation is easily performed by computing the 2xt
th power of Epk(x′i+t):
Epk
(
M
)
=
δ−1∏
t=0
(
Epk
(
x′i+t
))2x t
. (22)
The appropriate size of sw and sx are explored by
implementing them on a computer and evaluating the
simulated performance. It is worth mentioning that the
enciphering rate of the Paillier cryptosystem approaches
asymptotically 1 using the extension of the cryptosystem
[27] and then more data can be packed in one ciphertext.
Although the works in [28, 29] can encode rational numbers
by a limited precision, they are not suitable for the packing
operation.
4. Experimental Results
We have implemented our algorithm presented in Sect.3 and
compared the performance with the original spread spec-
trum watermarking technique [4]. Since the basic algorithm
of our scheme is Cox’s scheme with a limited precision,
we evaluate the degradation of an image by PSNR and the
detected correlation values because it directly reflects the
amount of changes between our fingerprinted image and
the original fingerprinted one. If the results are similar, we
regard that the performance of our simulated scheme is not
degraded from that of the original one. In our simulation,
a standard gray-scaled image “lenna” of 256 × 256 pixels is
used, and the constant values are set pw = 5 and p = 10000
(px is calculated by (13)). Even if pw and px are added, the
values of wi and xi might be negative. In such a case, the
values are simply rounded to 0. In the following simulation,
the number of simulation is 103 times, and the results are the
averaged values.
A quantization error is caused by the rounding oper-
ation after orthogonal transformation which converts the
frequency domain into the spatial domain as well as the
rounding operation at the embedding of signal. For the
evaluation of the quantization error i/α|xi| shown in
(18), the differences of watermarked images are calculated
with respect to the scaling parameters sw and sx, and the
probability density function (p.d.f.) is depicted in Figure 2
when L = 1000 and α = 0.1 changing the scaling parameters
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Figure 2: The probability density function of the quantization error when L = 1000 and α = 0.1, where the parenthetic numbers stands for
the scaling parameters (sw , sx).
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Figure 3: The probability density function of the quantization error for different L and α using the scaling parameters (sw , sx).
0
0.5
1P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
de
n
si
ty
1.5
2
c = 10
c = 5
c = 1
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Size of noise
(a) (23, 20)
0
0.5
1
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
de
n
si
ty
1.5
c = 10
c = 5
c = 1
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Size of noise
(b) (20, 23)
0
2
4
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
de
n
si
ty
6
8
10
12
14
16
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Size of noise
c = 10
c = 5
c = 1
(20, 20)
c = 10
c = 5
c = 1
(23, 23)
(c) (20, 20) and (23, 23)
Figure 4: The probability density function of the quantization error under the averaging attack of c copies when L = 1000 and α = 0.1 using
the scaling parameters (sw , sx).
8 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
34.5
34.7
34.9
35.1
25 24 23 22 21 20
22
24
20
C
or
re
la
ti
on
va
lu
e
sw
sx
(a) c = 1
41
41.4
41.8
25 24 23 22 21 20
22
24
20
C
or
re
la
ti
on
va
lu
e
sw
sx
(b) c = 5
43.5
44.1
44.7
25 24 23 22 21 20
22
24
20
C
or
re
la
ti
on
va
lu
e
sw
sx
(c) c = 10
Figure 5: The image quality for the scaling values sw and sx when L = 1000 and α = 0.1.
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attack for the number of colluders when (sw , sw) = (23, 23).
sw and sx. Figure 2(a) shows the quantization error by fixing
one scaling parameter sx = 20. We can see that the shape of
the p.d.f. is sharpened centering on zero with the increase
of sw. It is because of the decrease of the first term wi /sw
in (18). Figure 2(b) shows the quantization error by fixing
the other scaling factor sw = 20. It confirms that the value
of the quantization error is almost uniformly distributed
when sw is small because the first term wi /sw is not changed
and it distributes uniformly in the range [−0.5, 0.5]. It is
also noticed that the other terms in (18) is attenuated by
the increase of sx. Figure 2(c) confirms that the variance of
Table 1: The distribution of non-colluders’ correlation values when
L = 1000, α = 0.1, and (sw , sx) = (23, 23).
mean variance max
No attack original −0.0107 0.9676 3.3252
proposed 0.0020 0.9695 3.3030
Collusion original 0.0182 0.9672 3.9882
(c = 5 ) proposed 0.0473 0.9649 3.8162
Collusion original 0.0041 1.0075 4.0610
(c = 10 ) proposed 0.0045 1.0100 4.0568
the quantization error is decreased when both sw and sx are
increased. Since the performance of Cox’s scheme depends
on the parameters L and α, the comparison of the p.d.f. is
shown in Figure 3 using different values. We can see that the
variance of the p.d.f. becomes large when L is increased and
α is decreased. It is because the magnitude of selected DCT
coefficients xi becomes small when L is increased, hence,
the value of the corresponding quantization error i/α|xi|
becomes large. It is remarked that the embedded signal
energy as a watermark becomes smaller when α is decreased.
In the following simulation, we use the parameters L = 1000
and α = 0.1 for the evaluation.
It is important to evaluate the quantization error when
a collusion attack is performed. Considering the studies in
[21], we perform the averaging as the collusion attack. The
changes in the quantization error are depicted in Figure 4
using several combination of sw and sx. We can see that
there is a big changes of p.d.f. when (sw, sw) = (20, 23) from
Figure 4(b). It is because the first term wi /sw in (18) follows
Gaussian distribution considering the statistical property if c
is sufficiently large.
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Table 2: The degradation of the watermarked image when (sw , sx) = (23, 23).
aerial baboon barbala f16 girl lenna peppers
Original 36.344 36.664 34.784 35.979 36.003 35.035 34.621
Proposed 36.338 36.659 34.779 35.974 35.997 35.030 34.615
Table 3: The degradation of the correlation values when (sw , sx) = (23, 23).
aerial baboon barbala f16 girl lenna peppers
No attack
original 31.681 31.678 31.680 31.681 31.615 31.680 31.679
proposed 31.657 31.645 31.651 31.653 31.579 31.650 31.650
Collusion original 14.148 14.130 14.137 14.143 14.071 14.134 14.139
(c = 5 ) proposed 14.129 14.093 14.109 14.117 14.030 14.104 14.112
Collusion original 9.989 9.946 9.960 9.975 9.863 9.954 9.966
(c = 10 ) proposed 9.969 9.901 9.928 9.946 9.813 9.920 9.935
For the comparison of the image quality, the degradation
of watermarked images and averaged copies is shown in
Figure 5. We can see that the PSNR of our method is
approaching to the original one according to the increase
of scaling parameters sw and sx, and the degradation of the
PSNR is mainly dependent on sx. It is because the first term
wi /sw in (18) becomes small with the increase of sw. From
the results, we can say that our watermarked images are very
close to the original ones if sw ≥ 22 and sx ≥ 23.
For the evaluation of correlation values, we embed
a watermark signal using the original Cox’s scheme and
our scheme. The comparison of correlation values for the
watermark images is shown in Figure 6(a), where that of
the original scheme is 31.680 depicted by black line on the
top of the graph. The correlation values of averaged copies
are also shown in Figures 6(b) and 6(c), where the original
values are 14.134 and 9.954, respectively. We can see that
the performance is asymptotically reaching the original value
according to the increase of the scaling factors sw and sx.
Different from the results of PSNR, the correlation values
becomes very close to the original value if sw ≥ 23 and
sx ≥ 23. This means that the quantization error degrades the
correlation value much more than the value of PSNR. The
results indicate that the correlation value is more sensitive to
the noise injected to a watermarked image. The degradation
of the correlation values is also compared by changing the
number of colluders, which results are shown in Figure 7.
From the results, we can say that the correlation values of
our scheme using sw = sw = 23 are almost coincident with
the original values.
The error (false-positive) probability is an important
factor to evaluate the performance of fingerprinting scheme,
and the probability is dependent on the design of the
threshold for a correlation value to determine guilty. If
our method uses the same design of the threshold as the
original one, the changes of the probability can be evaluated
by the distribution of non-colluders’ correlation values.
Using 104 watermark signals assigned for non-colluders, the
correlation values are calculated. The mean and variance of
the correlation values and the maximum values are shown
Table 1. From the results, we can say that the distribution
of our method is very similar to that of original one. It is
remarkable that the maximum value of our method is slightly
smaller than that of original one. This means that the error
probability of our method is slightly improved.
From the above results, the degradation of performance
from the original scheme is very slight, and it does not
affect the robustness against attacks. It is noted that the
scaling factors sw and sx is closely related to the degradation
of performance. It is better to increase the value of these
parameters, for example sw ≥ 23 and sx ≥ 23, but
we have to consider the communication costs because the
bit-length to represent the watermarked DCT coefficient
xi + αiwi is increased according to the size of sw and sx,
which degrades the coding rate of such information. For
other images, “aerial”, “baboon”, “barbala”, “f16”, “girl”, and
“peppers”, the similar results are derived with the above
parameters as shown in Tables 2 and 3. The attenuation
of PSNR value from the original one is at most 0.016%,
that of the correlation value is at most 0.1%, and under the
averaging collusion the attenuation is less than 0.39%. As a
consequence, recommended parameters are sw = 23 and sx =
23 from our simulation results. It is expected that other kinds
of spread spectrum watermarking schemes will be simulated
with the similar precision, and the implementation is our
future work.
When we use the above recommended parameters, the
value of x′i can be represented by 20 bits (the range must
be within [0, 220] if sw = sx = 23 and p = 10000). For
the security reason, the bit-length of a composite n = pq
for the modulus of the Paillier cryptosystem should be no
less than 1024 bits. When |n| = 1024, an 1024-bit message
is encrypted to an 2048-bit ciphertext. Under the above
condition, the number of watermarked DCT coefficients in
one ciphertext is at most δ = 51(= [1024/20]). Since the
number of DCT coefficients are 65536 = 256 × 256, the
number of ciphertexts is 1286 (= [65536/51]) and the total
size of the ciphertexts is about 2.5 MB, which is about 40
times larger than the original file size 66 KB. In the case that
the packing is not performed, the total size is more than
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128 MB. Therefore, the proposed method efficiently imple-
ments the Cox’s spread spectrum watermarking scheme in
the asymmetric fingerprinting protocol.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss about the implementation of the
fingerprinting protocol based on the additive homomor-
phic property of public-key cryptosystems. The effects of
rounding operation which maps a real value into a positive
integer are formulated, and an auxiliary operation to obtain
a watermarked content is presented. From our simulation
results, the identification capability of our algorithm is
quite similar to the Cox’s algorithm, hence we can simulate
the scheme on the cryptographic protocol with a limited
precision.
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